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This article reconstructs and expands conversations initiated at a
seminar in New Orleans when a Florida attorney asked various questions
as to the effect of article 9 upon the financing of the citrus industry. The
seminar was presented by the ALI-ABA Joint Committee in February,
1967. The authors have not limited themselves to either the specific
questions or the answers suggested at the New Orleans meeting.
I. ARTICLE 9 IN GENERAL
Mr. Mays: Florida has only recently adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). Florida attorneys are concerned as to how the Code is
going to adopt to or change the practices of lenders and borrowers in
the citrus fruit industry. There are other problems, of course, but, apart
from the special problems of financing cattle, the citrus industry seems
to present more problems in a concentrated area than do other com-
modities raised in Florida. With these thoughts in mind, Mr. Coogan,
could you give us a brief introduction and history of article 9, with par-
ticular reference to the special rules applicable only to "farm products."
Mr. Coogan: In general article 9 merges into one body of law most of
the rules and doctrines governing security interests created by contract
which, prior to the UCC, were found in the separate statutory and case
law of the pledge, chattel mortgage, conditional sale, statutes governing
inventory liens in the form of trust receipts, field warehousing, so-called
factors liens, statutes and common law governing assignments of ac-
* Member of the Massachusetts Bar; partner in the law firm of Ropes & Gray, Boston,
Massachusetts. Lecturer, Harvard Law School.
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counts receivable, other rights under contracts, and some other intangi-
bles. Because the division of chattel security law into these bodies was
largely historical, at an early state in the drafting of article 9 it was
contemplated that the law be restated, not in terms of the security device
employed, but in terms of what were thought to be separable problems,
such as those facing the financer of consumer goods-those purchased
primarily for individual or family use; those facing the financer of
"equipment"-goods purchased primarily for use by business entities;
or those faced by one who financed "inventory"-goods held for sale or
lease. It was thought that "farm products" were sufficiently different
from these other categories to require separate treatment. However, when
the rules were put together in this manner it was found that the similar-
ities greatly out-weighed the differences. Hence, now only vestiges of
the idea of separate sets of rules based upon the type of collateral can
be found. They remain in the special treatment given particular kinds
of collateral in certain sections. One such vestige relates to "farm
products."
Mr. Mays: Does the Code cover all contractual security interests in
personal property or fixtures?
Mr. Coogan: Article 9 governs most but not all transactions involving
personal property security. Your question already eliminates a sub-
stantial number of liens-those which are not created by contract but
are rather imposed by statute, usually over the objection of the obligor.'
Further, article 9 is wholly or partly inapplicable to a number of security
interests created by contract. In the first instance, federal law controls
to a greater or lesser extent such matters as are governed by the Copy-
right Act or the Federal Aviation Act or the Ship Mortgage Act. State
law also governs special areas of contractually created security interests.
For instance, security interests in motor vehicles are governed to a
greater or lesser extent by non-uniform certificate of title laws, and
consumers are protected by varying special police type statutes.
2 Of
course the Code does not affect real estate mortgages as such, but this
does not mean that the real estate lawyer can disregard a knowledge of
article 9. Chattels attached to the land in a certain manner-fixtures and
crops-become subject to certain claims by the owner of interests in the
real estate, and crops produced by trees which are real estate become sub-
ject to chattel interests.
Mr. Mays: The confrontation of new UCC law and the old real estate
law is perhaps responsible for many of the questions on the applicability
of the Code to crop financing.
Mr. Coogan: Problems are quite common when these two bodies of
1. Uniform Commercial Code §§ 9-102, 9-104 (hereinafter cited as U.C.C.).
2. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203.
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law collide. We cannot give much time to the special problems of fixtures,
but we will, of course, discuss this real estate-UCC problem as it relates
to crops. But before we get into that question I would like to spend a
few more minutes on the general framework of article 9.
Within article 9 most security transactions are governed by the same
set of rules. There can be no security interest in a particular item of col-
lateral enforceable even between the parties unless and until the last of
three simple requisites has been satisfied: (a) the debtor has signed a
security agreement which reasonably describes the collateral, or in the
alternative he evidences the agreement by surrender of some particular
collateral (the pledge), (b) the secured party gives "value" (ordinarily
by furnishing goods not yet paid for or by advancing money to be repaid),
and (c) the debtor owns or later acquires some rights in the collateral.'
The security interest which has "attached," is not generally good against
third parties unless and until public notice has been given,4 most gener-
ally by filing in a public office, sometimes by surrender of possession of
the collateral of the secured party or his agent. In designated situations
(e.g., a purchase money security interest in consumer goods) public
notice is excused.5 In certain other cases, public notice may be tem-
porarily excused-e.g., for ten days in purchase money security trans-
actions.' When requirements (a), (b), and (c) are met and public notice
is given or excused, a security interest is said to be "perfected." '7 The
giving of public notice may be the first, the third, the second, or the
fourth step. The time of filing and the time of "perfection" will thus be
the same only where filing is the last of the four steps.
But a perfected security interest may be of little value unless the
prior steps have been taken in such a manner that this particular security
interest has priority over other possible security interests. To be entirely
safe, a lender should not make his advance until after a search of the
records, made at the same time that he files for himself, discloses that
there is no other security interest ahead of his. Because of the peculiar-
ities of the "first to file rule," which we shall mention later, he must also
be assured that there is on record no financing statement with respect to
the same class of collateral under which there could be a later security
interest which would jump ahead of his present security interest.
Particular problems arise where the security agreement relates to
collateral which is not in existence, or at least is not owned by the debtor
at the time that he enters into a valid security agreement. The Code
clears up much confusion in the law of some states with respect to the
3. U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-204.
4. U.C.C. §§ 9-303, 9-301.
5. U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(c)-(d).
6. U.C.C. § 9-304.
7. U.C.C. § 9-303.
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status of after-acquired property. It does not say that a Florida crop
financer obtains a present security interest in a crop which will be ac-
quired by his debtor three years from now when that years' blossoms
first appear. But it does say that if and when the debtor acquires this
item of collateral which fits within the description of the collateral cover-
ed by the security agreement, the debtor's interest, whatever it may be,
will automatically fall under the existing security agreement without
any further documents being executed. Property acquired within four
months of bankruptcy may create problems under the National Bank-
ruptcy Act over which the Code has limited effect.7a
Here we might mention a problem sometimes involving acquisitions
of future property. Prior to the Code many states had the rule that where
the secured party allowed the debtor to deal with the property too freely
(which usually meant freedom to sell the collateral without strict ac-
countability in applying the proceeds) the mortgage was fraudulent as a
matter of law. This is the familiar doctrine of Benedict v. Rattner,8 The
Code permits the debtor and the secured party to make any agreement
they may wish with respect to the degree of dominion which the respec-
tive parties are allowed to exercise over the collateral. The secured party
will, of course, continue to lose his collateral where his trust in the debtor
was misplaced, but he will no longer lose it because of his having so
trusted the debtor, without regard to what the debtor did with that
trust.
Article 9 also contains provisions which permit the parties to pro-
vide for future advances. Future advances made under the earlier filing
take priority over intervening advances protected by a later filing. Article
9 is not so clear as to the priority of the security interest created with
respect to those advances in some other cases. The common situation is
where a third party claims that between the time of the first advance
and the second advance he has obtained a security interest perfected by
a method other than filing or has obtained a lien by attachment or other
legal process on the collateral in question.
In general article 9 makes it easier to create security interests than
it was under the old law, but this very ease probably makes necessary a
more complicated system of priorities.
Mr. Mays: Mr. Coogan, the problems which Florida attorneys will now
encounter under the Code are not all new. Some were in a very unsettled
status prior to the enactment of the Code. Of course, in many instances
existing Florida law will lay the predicate for the solution under the
Code. Aside from these questions which we shall discuss at a later time,
7a. See generally Note, After Acquired Property Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A
Substitution of Collateral Defense of the U.C.C., 77 YALE L.J. 139 (1967).
8. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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why do you feel that a discussion such as this on the application of article
9 rules to farm security transactions is necessary?
Mr. Coogan: The rules which we have touched upon so far apply to all
collateral and to all secured parties, but there are some important vari-
ations. It is often said that details as to compliance (e.g., place of filing)
and the effect thereof (e.g., rights of certain buyers) may vary with the
character of the debtor or the nature of the collateral. It would, perhaps,
be more accurate to say that in the great bulk of the cases, rules will vary
not so much with physical differences in the collateral but rather with
the manner in which it is used. A hi-fi system purchased "on time" by
a farmer is "consumer goods" 9 (as to which no filing may be required' °
and subject to one rule as to rights of buyers)" if purchased primarily
for his own or his family's use. The same hi-fi system is "equipment"
(subject to a different rule as to filing and as to rights of buyers) if it
is purchased primarily for use in his milking parlor room to keep his
cows contented.'2 Since neither item of consumer goods or equipment
was purchased primarily with an eye to resale and neither is so held out
to the public, no special rules are necessary to protect buyers-they take
only the interest the seller then has-that is, subject to any existing
security. A farmer's financer is like the financer of any other person
when his debtor acts in a nonbusiness capacity (when the farmer gives
him a security interest in "consumer goods").
But the Code continues what was probably the majority pre-Code
view in treating the farmer-businessman's financer more favorably than
the financer of the non-farmer businessman when the collateral consists
of goods destined for sale by the farmer in the ordinary course of his
business. Further, the Code, in refining the concept of "products" (9-
315) may increase the protection heretofore given to the farmer's financer
at the expense of the farm products processor. Some of the problems
which we shall discuss grow out of the Code's prescription of different
rules for different debtors-i.e., businessmen who operate farms and
businessmen who operate businesses other than farms. Should a security
interest in wheat stored in a farmer's bin be subject to different rules as
to "buyers in the ordinary course" than those which apply to the same
buyer if he purchases from the operator of a grain elevator?
This difference in the rules based on the fact that one debtor may be
a farmer while another may not is one of the reasons why this discussion
is important. It so happens that the sponsors of the Code were unsuc-
cessful in enlisting the aid of anyone with a technical knowledge of farm
financing comparable to knowledge of other business financing supplied
9. U.C.C. § 9-109.
10. U.C.C. § 9-302(d).
11. U.C.C. § 9-307.
12. U.C.C. § 9-302.
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by some of the advisors to the draftsmen. Since article 9 is now under a
long-range re-examination by the sponsors it is hoped that discussion like
this may stimulate contributions by those knowledgeable in farm financ-
ing.
But other reasons require special treatment of Code security inter-
ests created in the operation of farming. In addition to article 9's wise
or unwise special rules which apply only where the debtor is a farmer,
there are other problems which complicate farm finance. Both livestock
and growing crops present, in acute form, familiar problems of obtaining
a security interest in property not owned by the debtor, and often not in
existence, at the time the debtor signs his security agreement. And farm
financing, like inventory financing problems of other businessmen, pre-
sents the usual problem of advances that must be made from time to time
after that security agreement is made. Farm equipment which is attached
or affixed to the land presents all the usual fixture problems. In addition,
farm finance is likely to present two problems not commonly found in
other nonbusiness financing: (1) when are security interests in crops
governed by real estate law and when by the Code, and (2) what are
the priorities in conflicts between contractually created Code security
interests and liens created by statute in favor of those who supply ser-
vices or materials in the growing of the collateral?
We should first make clear that article 9 has gone a long way towards
establishing a rational chattel security system. Experience over a number
of years in a number of states testifies to its general workability. The
question is not whether it has gone too far in changing pre-Code law,
but whether, in fact, it has gone far enough. While in isolated instances
article 9 may have adopted a rule less workable than the pre-Code law
of a particular state, there is no general demand for a retreat to the old
ways. If the real accomplishments of article 9 are not repeated here, it
is only because its praises have been well sung in the past.
II. SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR FARM PRODUCTS: 2a
REASON AND NON-REASON IN SECTION 9-307
Mr. Mays: Mr. Coogan, perhaps the most unusual provision of the
Code distinguishing the farmer from any other non-farmer businessman
is Section 9-307 which allows the buyer in the ordinary course of business
to take free of a security interest perfected by his seller, although he
knows of it, while denying such protection to the buyer of farm products
12a. The better discussions on farm products financing include the following: Clark,
Some Problems in Agricultural Lending Under the UCC, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 352 (1967);
Note, Secured Interests in Growing and Future Growing Crops Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 49 IowA L. REV. 48 (1964) ; Smith, Security Interests In Crops, 10 HASTINGS
L.J. 23, 156 (1958); Coates, Farm Secured Transactions Under the UCC, 23 Bus. LAW.
195 (1967).
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from the farmer. What are your views on this provision and do you think
that it should be retained in future revisions of the Code?
Mr. Coogan: The difficulties of a business debtor's using his inventory
as security for a loan have been told and retold so often that even a
short summary may seem superfluous, but the present general accept-
ance of the idea so long fought over may have caused us to forget the
battle. For a century the courts (and sometimes the legislatures) resisted
the use by business debtors of inventory as collateral. This was partly
because of conceptual difficuties, but also for the sound policy reason
that one who buys goods held out for sale should not have to worry
about security interests created by his seller. Over the years the courts
have developed the rather simple idea that, regardless of what the docu-
ment says, the security interest in such goods will not be honored against
a buyer in the orlinary course. This rather sensible idea was adopted
by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and by practically all recent factor's
lien acts. The secured party who takes a security interest in such goods
knows they must end up in the hands of a buyer if he is to be paid in
ordinary course, and he, not the innocent buyer in ordinary course of
business, must take the risk that a dishonest debtor-seller will fail to pay
over the proceeds. A combination of 9-307 plus 1-201(9) adopts this
philosophy generally-but not for the buyer of farm products.
Essentially, the exception in 9-307 reflects a philosophy that a farm-
er who borrows on his inventory cannot be trusted to turn over the pro-
ceeds from its sale in the way a lender has learned to trust other business-
men to do. The buyer of farm products, not the lender, must take the
risk that the seller does not live up to his promise.
A minor reflection of the UCC's concept of the farmer as a non-
business person is the exemption in 9-302(1) from filing for purchase
money security interests in any number of items of farm equipment pro-
viding that each costs less than $2500. The net effect may well be to make
such collateral of less than normal use to the farmer who wishes to borrow
on his equipment, but can point to no public record to evidence the ab-
sence of previously perfected purchase money security interests.
In the late 1960's a relatively small part of farm financing involves
a person who, like the Vermont hill farmer of a century ago, is primarily
a "consumer." Such a borrower got his sugar from the maple trees,
raised a few cows for milk, butter, and meat, carried his wheat to the
local miller, raised enough apples and potatoes for cider and food, raised
sheep for wool out of which his wife and daughter made the family
clothes, and perhaps sold enough lumber to provide the little cash needed
for salt pepper, rum and other necessities of life. If such subsistence
farmers exist somewhere, it is doubtful that they obtain much credit,
however secured.
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Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, in the citrus fruit industry
large amounts of capital are required, and the citrus grower is likely to
be not only like other businessmen, but like other large businessmen.
It would no doubt sometime be convenient for one who financed the
seller of steel to a maker of widgets to repossess the widgets from an
innocent buyer, if the widget seller did not repay his inventory loan, on
the theory that widgets are "products" of the steel. But 9-307 reflects
not only business morality but business necessity in rejecting that philos-
ophy-for all but farm products I
Mr. Mays: A possible justification for 9-307's treatment of farm
products is that while the buyer of widgets at the local hardware store is
an amateur deserving the law's protection against a professional lender,
the typical buyer of farm products is a purchaser at wholesale and more
likely to be a "professional" than is the local banker who financed the
crop.
Mr. Coogan: It might be thought that the once-a-year wholesale pro-
fessional buyer of the year's wheat crop was in a better position to search
for liens on his seller's record than for the seller's lender to police his
debtor. But conclusions are no more valid than the facts they are based on.
In another setting the typical milk dealer buys from dozens, hundreds, or
thousands of small producers. It is impossible for him to know when
Farmer Green gives a chattel mortgage on cow Bessie and her products
(including, by definition of 9-109(3), her milk). And when mortgaged
Bessie's milk is sold to Mrs. Black, the security interest created by the
mortgage on Bessie follows the milk down Baby Black's throat.
Mr. Mays: Although the milk had ceased to be farm products, and
had become inventory of the milk dealer, nevertheless the security inter-
est in the milk was not cut off by 9-307.
Mr. Coogan: Exactly, because 9-307(1) cuts off only security interests
created by the seller (the retail milk dealer in this case), and here, of
course, the security interest was created by the seller's seller. If we sub-
stitute orange juice for milk, we come to the same result, except to the
extent that citrus producers tend to sell in larger units; here the buyer's
making a search for security interests in the crops they are buying be-
comes merely difficult, rather than impossible.
Mr. Mays: Can we say generally, Mr. Coogan, that, except for the
provisions of 9-307, one who furnishes money to a farmer based on the
security of goods purchased by the farmer primarily for his own or his
family's use is governed by no special rules unless the item is so close to
being business equipment that filing for that category is expedient, in
which case the place to file may be different than if the business were
other than farming? Can we not also say that except for the place of
filing (or possible exemption from filing under 9-302(1)(c)) there is
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no basic difference between perfecting security interests in farm equip-
ment and in other business equipment and assignment by a farmer of
accounts, contract rights or general intangibles and assignment of such
collateral by a non-farmer?
Mr. Coogan: This is true, but when we come to the rights of a financer
and those of a buyer in the ordinary course, we find a great difference
between comparable assets of the farmer and the non-farmer.
Mr. Mays: I think it would be beneficial if you would explain the
general rule under the Code covering the continuity of security interests
-the concept of "proceeds"-and then discuss in detail the special pro-
tective provisions of 9-307.
Mr. Coogan: We start first with the general rule of 9-306:
(2) Except where this article otherwise provides, a security
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange
or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise, and continues in any identifiable proceeds received
by the debtor. (Emphasis added).
Section 9-307 gives special protection to certain buyers against ap-
plication of this rule of 9-306 (2) when it provides in 9-307 (1):
(1) A buyer in the ordinary course of business.., other than
a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farm-
ing operations takes free of a security interest created by his
seller even though the security interest is perfected and the
buyer knows of its existence.
Before examing the exception for those who buy farm products, we might
take a look at the definition of "farm products" and the definition of
this "buyer in ordinary course of business" who is protected for all but
farm products.
Section 9-109 defines "farm products" as follows:
Goods are (3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock
or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they
are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured
state (such as ginned cotton, wool clip, maple syrup, milk and
eggs) and if they are in the possession of one engaged in rais-
ing, fattening, grazing or other farm operations ....
The definition of "buyer in ordinary course" covers a considerable
amount of substantive law. Section 1-201(9) provides:
Buyer in the ordinary course of business means a person who
in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights or security interests of a third
1967]
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party in the goods buys in the ordinary course from a person
in the business of selling goods of that kind .... Buying ... does
not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total satis-
faction of a money debt.
It might be argued that sale by a farmer to a grain elevator operator
of a year's crop of wheat might be a transfer in bulk and thus exclude
the buyer from the class of "buyers in the ordinary course of business"
without the special exclusion in 9-307(1). Bulk transfer, however, is a
word of art. While the definition of 6-102 may not be technically appli-
cable it indicates what is meant-a transfer not in the ordinary course of
business. Here the buyer, even if he buys "in bulk" is not taking a
"transfer in bulk."
One might justify the lack of the usual protection given to buyers
of farm products on the basis that the buyer is likely to be fully as
sophisticated as the growers' financer, and, since he ordinarily buys at
infrequent intervals, it is not too great a burden to require him to search
the record. However, from a practical standpoint I am advised by you,
Mr. Mays, that such a procedure would indeed be a costly and time-
consuming burden, and, as a matter of fact, is hardly ever done. The
same argument would impose a similar burden on, say, a shoe wholesaler
or a retail shoe store chain-but the Code requires no such duty as a
condition to the wholesale or retail shoe buyer's taking free of all security
interests created by his seller. Further, the policy argument breaks down
completely when it is applied to the milk dealer who daily buys 110
pounds of milk from farmer A, 215 pounds from farmer B, and so on
until farmer Z. But leaving aside for the moment the relative rights of
the fruit-processor-buyer and the grower's financer, the Code, by its
elaboration in 9-315 of the heretofore vague doctrine of "products" may
extend the problem.
Mr. Mays: Suppose a crop of oranges subject to S's security interest
is sold to a concentrate processor and the debtor fails to pay over the
proceeds. Under 9-307(1) S can follow the oranges into the hands of
the processor, and, unless I am misreading 9-315, S's security interest
continues in the frozen concentrate. To stretch a point, suppose that S
can trace only 25% of his collateral, and only 15% of the value of the
concentrate was contributed by the oranges, nevertheless S seeks to col-
lect 100% of his debt by enforcing his "products" security interest in
the concentrate. Will the courts allow him to do so, notwithstanding
what 9-315 says?
And suppose further that the processor sells ten cases of packed
frozen juice to a grocery wholesaler, who sells it to a corner grocery
store, where you buy a can, Perhaps you are safe on the theory that no
one will attempt to repossess your purchase, but what about the whole-
saler?
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Mr. Coogan: He seems to be out of luck. While as a practical matter a
security interest is ordinarily cut off by a rightful sale by anyone in the
chain of title, and the frozen concentrate is no longer farm products after
it leaves the farmer, 9-307's cut-off applies, as we have discussed, only to
security interests created by the seller. The security interest, of course,
was created by the farmer, as to whom the rule does not apply. I can
only say that the treating of the farmer as a second-class businessman
who cannot be trusted to turn over proceeds of collateral raised for sale
is the result of conditions long since changed.
Mr. Mays: I note with much interest that in the first reported case
that I have seen on this subject, the court has found a way to obviate
the provisions of 9-307 which we have been discussing.
Mr. Coogan: You refer no doubt to the recent case in New Mexico
where the court allowed a cattle dealer to disregard a security interest
in cattle which he had purchased from a cattleman.
Mr. Mays: Yes. In Clovis National Bank v. Thomas1 a New Mexico
bank made a loan secured by cattle and expressly provided in the security
agreement that the debtor was not to sell or dispose of the cattle "without
the prior written consent of the Secured Party." The debtor marketed
the cattle through a commission house and failed to apply the proceeds
to the payment of the loan at the bank. The bank brought an action
against the commission house for conversion. The court found that the
same sequence of events had occurred previously between the same
parties except that the cattleman had paid off the bank. The court further
found that the plaintiff bank, although perhaps not expressly consenting
to the sale in question, did impliedly acquiesce in and consent to the
sale, although fully aware of its right to require written consent, and
therefore, the bank waived its rights under the security agreement.
Mr. Coogan: The case you mention indicates that the courts have al-
ready begun to whittle away the exception that 9-307 purports to give
the financer of farm products. This whittling away is in accord with
previous case and statutory law. The two principal inventory security
devices, namely, the Uniform Trust Receipts Act and the non-uniform
factors liens act protected the buyer in the ordinary course of business of
inventory that was subject to a security interest. In doing so they merely
followed the courts in a line of cases growing out of the various condi-
tional sales and chattel mortgage acts, most of which did not specifically
provide for this problem at all. This case is also doubly interesting in that
here in spite of the language of 9-307 and the language of the security
agreement the court found that there was a course of conduct by which
the secured party had authorized the sale and therefore the exception
in section 9-307 did not apply to this sale of farm products. Under 9-306,
13. 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726(1967).
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the right to follow the collateral after a sale is cut off if the secured party
gives the debtor express or implied permission to sell.
III. FRUIT ON THE TREE: REALTY OR PERSONALTY?
A BASIS FOR DISPUTE
Mr. Mays: Problems relating to farm products under the Code are
not limited to the differences in the fact that farm products are subject
to some special rules under article 9. Another question which we must
consider is very basic: to what extent are security interests in growing
crops subject to real estate law and to what extent are they subject to
the Code?
Mr. Coogan: Your question is indeed very basic, but I confess that
until you brought up this question several months ago I had never given
it much thought. Before I give you my present thinking, I would like to
ask you, as a Florida lawyer, to outline the law of Florida prior to the
Code on the question of when real estate law controlled and when per-
sonal property law controlled.
A. The Pre-Code Law in Florida
Mr. Mays: Let me attempt to present a very brief description of the
pre-Code Florida law on the question of whether growing crops constitute
real estate or chattels.
On the question of whether crops are governed by real estate law
or personal property law there appears to be an inconsistency between
several Florida cases. Basically, the cases of Adams v. Adams14 and
Simmons v. Williford1" among others provide what I feel to be a clear
analysis of the Florida law. These cases hold that fruit crops unseparated
from trees or vines whether regarded as fructus naturalaes or fructus
industriales are part of the realty unless otherwise actually or construc-
tively severed by the intention of the owner. A different rule, however,
exists as to unharvested crops of corn, hay, beans or other such fructus
industriales growing only by yearly cultivation, which are generally held
to be personal property and not a part of the real estate.'"
Mr. Coogan: I don't want to interrupt your trend of thought as to
what pre-UCC cases hold, but I would like to make two preliminary
points. As I read the cases you referred me to, in late years Florida
courts tended to accept decisions from other states that fruits crops are
no different than, say, a corn crop. But I don't think this distinction is
now important for our purposes because the UCC may very well change
14. 158 Fla. 173, 28 So.2d 254 (1946).
15. 60 Fla. 359, 53 So. 452 (1910).
16. See Summerlin v. Orange Shoes, Inc., 97 Fla. 996, 122 So. 508, 510 (1929) ; see also
Stoltzfus v. Covington County Bank, 154 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1963) citing the Summerlin case.
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whatever that law was. I refer to the definition of "goods" both in article
2 and in article 9, each of which includes growing crops, and the specific
inclusion of "farm products" (which includes crops) as one of the main
categories of article 9 collateral.
Mr. Mays: I am not sure that I agree with your comment as to the hold-
ings of the later Florida cases, however, we will come back to that ques-
tion.
Concentrating for the present on the question of the priority be-
tween a pre-existing real estate mortgage and a crop mortgage encumber-
ing the fruit of a growing tree held to constitute a part of the realty until
severed, the Summerlin case sets forth what I feel to be the law in Flo-
rida. In this case, the supreme court held that before default in payment
of a debt secured by a pre-existing real estate mortgagee, an owner may
give a chattel mortgage upon the fruit in being and upon subsequent
default in the chattel mortgage, the chattel mortgage may take posses-
sion of the crop but that the owner cannot create a lien superior to the
first mortgage upon the land by attempting to mortgage fruit which
does not come into existence until after default in the first mortgage and
institution of foreclosure proceedings. The real estate mortgage in the
Summerlin case did not specifically cover crops and was executed prior
to the 1925 Florida law recognizing the validity of liens on future crops.
The Hughes v. Summit Realty Company case 7 in distinguishing the
Summerlin case, pointed out that the law in Summerlin was only valid
insofar as mortgages executed prior to the 1925 crop lien act were con-
cerned, and held that where a prior real estate mortgage did not speci-
fically encumber crops, a subsequent crop mortgage could encumber
the crops upon the realty for the present year and until the mortgagor's
note was fully paid. The court discounts arguments by the appellant
(which I feel to be the better view) that the holder of a mortgage on the
real estate, as an incident to the mortgage, maintains the right to sell the
land as well as the growing crops thereon which have not matured and
been severed, and that such right is superior to the rights of the holder of
a subsequently acquired crop lien.
Mr. Coogan: May I, as a lawyer totally ignorant of any peculiarities
of Florida real estate mortgage law, timidly express the opinion that the
view adopted by the court is the "better view"?
Mr. Mays: In any event, the court based its holding upon the economic
purposes to be served by allowing a farmer the right to encumber a citrus
crop for labor and fertilizer in order to continue the productivity of the
land.
The Hughes case cites with approval Haines City Citrus Growers'
17. 120 Fla. 141, 162 So. 343 (1935).
1967]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
Ass'n v. Petteway8 which involved a purchase money real estate mort-
gage which did not specifically encumber the fruit, and which was exe-
cuted after the 1925 crop lien act. In the Haines City case, however, the
chattel mortgage was dated prior to the date of the execution and delivery
of the real estate mortgage, but was not recorded prior to the default in the
real estate mortgage, and as a matter of fact, only the present crop was re-
quired in order to pay off the sums outstanding under the chattel mort-
gage. Although the Haines City case distinguished the Summerlin case
as did Hughes, this distinction was not necessary to the decision, as the
court held that the crop lien was prior in time to the real estate mortgage
and did not have to be recorded to be valid against the real estate mort-
gage, since the real estate mortgagee was not in the position of a subse-
quent encumbrancer or subsequent purchaser under the provisions of the
crop lien act.
The foregoing cases to the contrary notwithstanding, I believe that
the current Florida position is set forth in the case of E. C. Fitz & Co. v.
Eldridge.9 This case involved the conflict between a pre-existing real
estate mortgage which was executed after the effective date of the 1925
crop lien act and a subsequently executed crop mortgage. Although the
court adopted the ruling of Summerlin and quoted at length the rules of
law pronounced therein, the real estate mortgage was in default prior to
execution of the crop mortgage and proceedings to foreclose the real
estate mortgage had been instituted prior to the bloom of the crop in
question. For this reason it may be argued that much of the reasoning
of the Fitz case is mere dicta. Nevertheless, the court held that the "opin-
ion and judgment" of the Summerlin case was controlling and that al-
though an owner could give a chattel mortgage upon fruit, he could not
give a valid chattel mortgage upon fruit for an indefinite period of time
extending over years operating to give a superior lien over a prior real
estate mortgage upon the land only, so as to subject the fruit not yet
mature or even in existence to the lien of the chattel mortgage. The court
also negated the validity of a bill of sale purporting to constructively sever
and transfer title to the mature crop upon the trees on the basis that such
bill of sale was not effective until one day after final foreclosure had been
entered. There was further evidence to the fact that the bill of sale was
given without present consideration.
It is my opinion that the foregoing cases will be extremely impor-
tant in determining the priorities question between a valid crop lien under
the Code and a pre-existing real estate mortgage which either specifically
covers fruit, or covers only the real estate. It appears, however, that the
questions raised by the Hughes and Haines City cases have never been
adequately resolved and that therefore, even under the Code, a very good
18. 107 Fla. 344, 145 So. 183 (1932).
19. 129 Fla. 647, 176 So. 539 (1937).
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argument could be made that a subsequent secured party holding a crop
lien could take a valid interest in fruit to mature on trees in the future
although the real estate upon which the trees are located is encumbered
by a prior real estate mortgage. Of course, the counter-argument, and
what appears to me to be the better view, is that such a secured party
can only acquire an interest in the matured fruit, or fruit which matur-
ed from a bloom on the trees which was in existence prior to a default
in the real estate mortgage. Consequently, any such security interest
would be enforceable only as against the current fruit crop, or at most,
two year's crops, in any priority conflict with rights under a prior real
estate mortgage. In my opinion, any holding other than in accordance
with Summerlin would effectually destroy the value of farm lands in and
of themselves, as security, and require lenders to obtain a crop security
interest in addition to a real estate mortgage. It is unfortunate that the
facts of the Fitz case do not clearly substantiate the rules of Summerlin
which were apparently adopted by Fitz.
Mr. Coogan: I am glad to hear a Florida lawyer admit that he has
some difficulty in deciphering the pre-UCC law on the possible conflicts
between a chattel mortgagee of a crop, and the rights of a real estate
mortgagee whose mortgage did not purport to cover crops. I must say,
however, that these interesting cases add very little to the result obtained
under (1) the UCC and (2) the law relating to the foreclosure of the
debtor's interest in land under real estate law. Let us take an example.
Suppose that, before the UCC became effective, 0 the Owner, gave
a 20-year mortgage on a 100 acre citrus grove to Mortgagee, M. The
mortgage said nothing about fruits or crops but it contained the standard
language encumbering the real estate and its "rents, issues and profit."
While the real estate mortgage was in good standing, and after the citrus
trees were in bloom, 0 borrowed $50,000 from his local bank, to be re-
paid from the proceeds of the current fruit crop. A crop mortgage in ac-
cordance with chapter 700, Florida Statutes, 1965, was recorded in the
public records of the county where the real estate is located. The crop
was greatly damaged by a hail storm, and 0 defaulted in his quarterly
payment on the real estate mortgage. M, the real estate mortgagee, claimed
this year's crop as part of the rents and profits after default in the
real estate mortgage, and bank claims under its current crop mortgage.
Mr. Mays: As evidenced by my foregoing discussion of the applicable
Florida law under a pre-existing real estate mortgage that does not con-
tain provisions encumbering the crop, prior to default the owner may deal
with the fruit as personalty. In this case, prior to a default in the real
estate mortgage, M constructively severed the growing fruit by giving a
crop mortgage thereupon to bank. Although the real estate mortgagee
could have taken possession of the real estate after M's default, the
bank's interest had by that time intervened, and was properly perfected.
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Mr. Coogan: I assume that Florida courts, like courts almost every-
where, have construed the "rents, issues and profits" clause, almost re-
gardless of its wording, as becoming effective only after default or more
likely after the appointment of a receiver, and therefore this additional
wording would add little to the foregoing discussion and your conclusions
as to the case law in Florida.
Mr. Mays: In Haines City the court cites Pasco v. Gamble,20 an early
case in 15 Florida which I suppose adopts the usual lien theory rule as to
the mortgagor's rights to control rents and profits until his rights are set
aside by a receivership or foreclosure. However, in our present discussion
I am considering the real property characteristics of the unsevered fruit
and its attachment as a part of the real estate security, rather than as a
"profit" of the land. Of course, as you apparently are implying, and as
indicated by several of the Florida cases, if the unsevered fruit is per-
sonalty, the inclusion of a "rents, issues and profits" clause and appoint-
ment of a receiver would have much more meaning. In my opinion a
crop mortgage covering existing fruit would take priority over a pre-
existing real estate mortgage whether or not covering "rents, issues and
profits," unless the real estate mortgage were in default prior to the first
bloom of the fruit to be covered by the crop mortgage. Of course, al-
though we have spoken of the emphasis to be placed upon the pre-exist-
ing real estate mortgage being in default, the Florida cases are not at all
specific as to whether the pre-existing real estate mortgage must merely
be in default, or must be in default and foreclose proceedings instituted
thereon, or whether final decree in foreclosure is the critical factor.
Mr. Coogan: Before I give the reasons which prevent me from agreeing
with Mr. Mays as to the "real property characteristics of the unsevered
fruit" let us first discuss another topic which may aid in the understanding
of this problem.
Suppose, Mr. Mays, 0, the owner gives to M a real estate
mortgage in the usual form-and by that I mean no mention of crops as
such-on a citrus grove and prior to default on his real estate mortgage,
O gives to S an article 9 security interest on the crop. There is now a
default under both the real estate mortgage and the security agreement.
If I understand what you said earlier, the article 9 interest will have
priority?
Mr. Mays: On the assumption that pre-Code analogies continue to
apply, as I think they should, that is correct. However, if the real estate
mortgagee had adequately covered present and future crops by making it
clear that the same instrument granted both a real estate mortgage and
an article 9 security interest, M's earlier security interest, if properly
perfected, would have given him priority without regard to a default in
20. 15 Fla. 562 (1876).
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the real estate mortgage. In your example, however, where S claims future
crops, S takes priority over crops which come into bloom prior to a de-
fault in the real estate mortgage. When a default later exists, assuming
that Fitz v. Eldridge and its adoption of Summerlin constitutes the Florida
law, S is subordinate to M.
B. Old Law and Article 9-Recording
Mr. Coogan: Suppose that the pre-UCC real estate mortgage also
claimed crops which it adequately described, or suppose that the old mort-
gage was one recorded under chapter 700, Florida Statutes, would you
recommend that the mortgagee now file a financing statement under
article 9?
Mr. Mays: Whether this was a combined real estate-crop mortgage,
or a crop mortgage under chapter 700, the short answer is "yes." It is
always more advisable to make a recording which may be unnecessary
than to get involved in litigation.
Mr. Coogan: One can argue that under 10-101 this is a transaction to be
"completed" under the old law. However, a trustee in bankruptcy would
maintain that the security interest in the new crop "attached" after the
new crop came into existence (9-102, 9-204) (at a time when the UCC
was in effect) and that therefore failure to comply with the UCC resulted
at best in an unperfected security interest. To be safe, the mortgagee
should file under article 9 and he should also execute a supplementary
agreement (which could be on a postcard) by which the parties agree
that henceforward they are operating under the rules of article 9.
Mr. Mays: How necessary is the second step-the execution of a sup-
plementary agreement?
Mr. Coogan: I would argue that in a state (like Florida) that allowed
a security agreement to pick up future crops, such an agreement merely
confirmed the obvious. Section 9-203 does not say that the "agreement"
must be made after the effective date of the UCC, but in at least one
case a court has held that a Code filing was insufficient without a security
agreement executed after that date. The safe position, whether the future
crop interest is to arise under a chapter 700 crop mortgage, or a combined
real estate-crop mortgage, is to execute a supplemental agreement and to
record under 9-401 after the effective date of the UCC. Such a course of
action guards against the argument that under 9-102 the crops coming into
existence after the effective date of the Code would be a "transaction"
under 9-102 which occurred after that date and to which the Code would
apply. This argument would apply also as to any new money advanced
after the effective date of the Code. I think that the best recommendation
which we can offer at this point is that all old security agreements of this
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nature which are presently in effect should be modified to comply with
the Code to prevent future disputes from arising.
Mr. Mays: Now that I have discussed the pre-Code Florida law on the
interests of those claiming crops as collateral under a chattel mortgage
and those claiming under a real estate mortgage, I'd like to hear your
comments as to how much of the old law survives for transactions after
the effective date of the Code.
Mr. Coogan: When, several months ago, I asked you to summarize pre-
Code Florida crop law for me, I was under the impression that the effect
of the UCC on crops, like the effect of the UCC on fixtures, would to a
considerable degree depend on the pre-Code law. After studying the cases
and the statutes to which you called my attention, and after further con-
sidering the Code provisions, I am presently of the opinion that the rights
of those claiming a security interest in crops in any state are to be found
primarily in article 9 in the form adopted by that state's legislature. The
state's pre-Code law has a limited effect.
Crops are one of five categories of property which have some char-
acteristics of realty and some characteristics of personalty. Article 9, and
the Code generally, does not treat each of these categories in the same
way. After reflection, I am presently of the opinion that, so far as
sales of, and security interests in, crops are concerned the UCC controls.
This conclusion is not weakened by the fact that local law may treat
crops as realty for some other purposes-suppose 0 sells his land to X
without mention of growing crops. The law of some state might say that
O's interest in the crops goes to X. But if 0 had given a crop security
interest to S, X takes subject to S's security interest.
Mr. Mays: How have you reached your conclusions?
Mr. Coogan: Both article 2 on sales and article 9 on secured transactions
define "goods" to include growing crops. Sales of goods are governed by
article 2 and security interest in goods are governed by article 9. By these
definitions the Code adopts the view towards which courts and legisla-
tures have been moving for some time-sales of and security interests
in growing crops are governed by personal property law. This is true
without distinction between industrial crops and natural crops, and with-
out the fiction of constructive severance affected through the intention of
the parties. For these reasons, I question your earlier assumption that
your hypothetical real estate mortgagee was claiming an interest in the
crops in their character as real estate. For security purposes, crops are
now goods, and for security purposes are governed only by the Code.
Either the real estate mortgagee perfected his interest in crops under
the UCC, or he has no more interest in crops than he has in other personal
property. For what it is worth, it is my observation that most cases
interpreting the 1925 crop statute looked on it as producing the same
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effect, except where the real estate mortgage had been executed prior to
enactment of the 1925 Act.
Mr. Mays: But section 2-107(3), which governs sales of goods somehow
related to real estate, recognizes that such goods may form a part of the
realty at the time of contracting, and that a contract for the sale of such
property may be invalid against certain real estate interests unless re-
corded in the real estate records.
Mr. Coogan: In the first place, I am not at all sure that 2-107 (3) applies
to crops. It may well apply only to gas, oil, minerals, etc., which have much
more of a real estate flavor than crops. But suppose a state does have such
a statute that applies to a sale of crops, it is perfectly conceivable that the
legislature may require notice to be made available in the real estate
records of certain transactions affecting personal property closely asso-
ciated with realty. For some purposes other than sales and security in-
terests (for example taxation), growing crops may well be treated as
realty.
Mr. Mays: You referred to other classes of property which have some
characteristics of both realty and personalty. What have you in mind, in
addition to fixtures?
Mr. Coogan: Section 2-107 treats several categories of "goods to be
served from the realty." It provides that a contract for the sale of timber,
minerals or the like, or materials to be removed from realty, is a con-
tract for the sale of goods only if to be severed by the seller. Contracts for
the sale of growing crops, on the other hand, are treated as personalty
whether they are to be severed by the buyer or the seller. This same
emphasis on the chattel nature of crops is repeated in 9-204. There can
be no security interest in timber until it is cut, in gas, oil or minerals
until they are extracted. Up until that moment these properties are under
real estate law. But again, for security purposes, crops are treated as
personalty from the instant they are planted or otherwise become growing
crops. Both 9-204 and 9-312(2) treat encumbrances on crops, even when
covered in real estate documents, as security interests (i.e., article 9
interests) not as realty interests. In this respect crops are treated quite
differently from the other categories of mixed personalty-realty, particu-
larly the category we have not discussed at length-fixtures.
Mr. Mays: I'd like to postpone my questions on fixtures. Are you taking
the position that the old Florida agricultural cases have no bearing on the
treatment of security interests created in crops?
Mr. Coogan: It is my present position that unlike the UCC's treatment
of fixtures, where some part of pre-Code law is adopted, the UCC largely
sets its own standards for crop security interests. In the absence of a
Code provision as to when annual fruit becomes a crop, I suppose a rule
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like Florida's rule that a fruit crop becomes such when the first maternal
blossoms appear would control.
Mr. Mays: You then take the position that the rules pronounced in the
Summerlin and Fitz cases-if they constitute the Florida law-are no
longer applicable?
Mr. Coogan: First, let me confess that even after reading Fitz and all
the other cases to which you have referred me, I am not quite sure what
that case holds. It may mean only that where 0 owns a citrus grove sub-
ject to M's earlier real estate mortgage, and 0 agrees that S will auto-
matically acquire a security interest in a crop when it later comes into
existence, S's potential security interest in that future crops may be cut
off by the land being taken out of O's possession by M's foreclosure pro-
ceeding before the hoped-for collateral becomes a crop. If that is what
Fitz means, it is consistent with 9-204's provision that no security interest
in a particular crop exists until that crop comes into existence.
Mr. Mays: You are treating crops from a citrus tree purely as a series
of yearly productions like crops of corn, rather than as a continuous out-
put of a tree which constitutes a part of the real estate.
Mr. Coogan: On this interpretation, yes. The Code is not entirely clear
as to whether a crop means an annual production, or the entire output
of a plant. I suppose it is clear that two separate plantings of spinach in
one year are two crops-but what about three crops of alfalfa grown on
irrigated land in one year with no new planting? To come back to citrus
fruit, if you construe a "crop" as the product of the tree for one year or
one season, and if you interpret Fitz as meaning that S may not get a
hoped-for security interest in a crop which comes into existence after a
foreclosure of an earlier real estate mortgage, I don't see that the result
is basically different from the situation where a mill operator agrees that
S will, without further act of either party, acquire a security interest in
next year's out-put of the mill. The Code does not give a present security
interest in collateral not yet in existence, but provides a mechanism by
which that property falls under the security interest when acquired by
the debtor. The debtor may never acquire the collateral. A mill operator
agrees that S will automatically acquire a security interest in all of next
year's woolen goods. Now suppose that before the year is over the holder
of an earlier real estate mortgage makes manufacture of goods impossible
by taking away the mill owner's factory. Or suppose the mill burns down,
or that a strike prevents its operation, or the mill had been operated under
a lease which terminates. The fruit grower's loss of his land is basically
no different from the case I put. Particularly if the grower loses his land
and his trees without bad faith on the part of the new owner, it is diffi-
cult to see how a crop not yet in existence will thereafter fall under the
security agreement executed by a former owner. The former owner will
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never acquire any rights in that future crop, which is necessary if a
security interest is to attach to that crop under 9-204. Conceivably the
parties could by special arrangement convert their security agreement
into a covenant running with the land but an ordinary security agreement
would not have that effect.
Mr. Mays: It is my opinion that the Summerlin and Fitz cases mean
only that a lien cannot be created on crops to come into existence in the
future so as to subject the future fruit to a lien superior to the lien of
a properly recorded pre-existing real estate mortgage. Under your con-
clusions, the Florida amendment allowing future security interests to
attach for seven years under an after-acquired property clause covering
crops is meaningless, except merely as a matter of convenience in effect-
ing a new loan. This would actually mean that agricultural financing
under the Code is much more restricted than under old Chapter 700,
which is certainly contrary to what I feel was the intent of the legislature
in enacting the Code. You are in effect disagreeing with both Summerlin
and Fitz as well as what I feel is the reasoning behind the holdings of
the Hughes and Haines City cases which arguably uphold the efficacy
of the after-acquired provisions of the old crop lien act, without regard
to the continued ownership of the property by the debtor. It is my feeling
that under the old law, and under the UCC, a valid crop lien can be given
that will bind subsequent disposition of the real estate, voluntarily or
involuntarily, but that such an interest will not bind enforcement under a
pre-existing real estate mortgage which may not specifically include
crops, the recording of which constitutes constructive notice to the holder
of a subsequent crop lien. In effect you are saying that a debtor cannot
assure himself of a perfected security interest in future crops to cover
an initial advance that may not be completely repaid from a current
crop due to crop failure.
Mr. Coogan: Not at all; between the debtor and secured party, such an
agreement is good. Further, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances in
which the crop secured party who first recorded could be deprived of his
first priority [9-312(5) (a)]. (In a rare combination of circumstances,
at a time when no debt was outstanding under the early recorded agree-
ment, a second secured party conceivably could perfect through taking
possession of the crop-9-312(5)(b).) If through any cause the debtor
loses the trees on which the future crop is to be grown, he can never acquire
the "rights" in the future crop necessary to create a security interest in
that crop under 9-204(2) (a). If you are saying only that the existence of
the debtor's agreement to give a security interest to S in next year's crop
does not prevent a real estate mortgagee from enforcing his mortgage,
we agree. Section 9-311 says that the debtor may voluntarily or in-
voluntarily part even with property which has already become collateral
(and next year's crop cannot become such until next year). That disposi-
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tion is valid even if the agreement makes it a default. If Fitz v. Eldridge
means more than what I have said, I don't think it should be followed
after adoption of the Code. Conceivably a court could find that a real
estate mortgage which predated the 1925 crop mortgage act carried with
it rights to crops as realty; I am not sufficiently well informed on Florida
law to discuss that point.
Mr. Mays: I agree with your analysis of the provisions of the Code
which would seemingly require that the debtor have rights in the real
estate, and therefore the crops, as a condition precedent to the perfection
of a security interest at the time future crops come into being. Techni-
cally, I see no alternative to this result, from a literal reading of the
Code. As previously indicated, however, it is my opinion that under pre-
Code Florida law, the citrus fruit would constitute a part of the real
estate and therefore a Florida court, in order to obtain a satisfactory
result, may continue to classify citrus fruit as real estate, notwithstanding
the various uses of the term "growing crops" under the Code. The Code
terminology of "growing crops" could be held to apply only to those
industrial crops which do not, by Florida case law, constitute a part of
the real estate and the Code by virtue of the specific provisions of
9-104(10) could be construed not to apply to crops constituting a part of
the real estate. If this would be the holding of a Florida court, it is my
further opinion that the Fitz and Summerlin cases would be held to con-
stitute the Florida law insofar as conflicts with pre-existing real estate
mortgages are concerned, and the holding of the Hughes case would con-
stitute the Florida law as to the rights to be attributed to a mortgagee of
future citrus crops. In my opinion, the Hughes case specifically substan-
tiates the pre-Code Florida law that under Chapter 700 the lien on a
crop of citrus fruit in being would succeed to future crops, as they come
into existence, until the debt secured thereby is paid in full. This is the
specific question which was framed by the Hughes court and answered in
the affirmative. The court concluded that the holder of the fee can mort-
gage his crops at will so long as he complies with the provisions of the
crop lien act and could therefore mortgage his crops "for the year and
until his note was fully paid."
The case of Neal v. Bradenton Production Credit Ass'n 20 a further
substantiates what I feel to be the holding of the Hughes case. In this
case a production credit association filed suit to foreclose a mortgage
which encumbered both the real estate and "all crops, fruit and other
products planted, growing and to be planted, grown and raised (during
the current and five succeeding crop seasons and until said indebtedness
is paid), upon the lands hereinabove described . . ." In the meantime
the mortgagors had entered into an agreement with a fruit company
whereby it delivered the real estate and fruit crops to the fruit company
20a. 200 So. 845 (Fla. 1941).
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for the production and handling of all the fruits to be thereafter grown
on the property. It was alleged by the fruit company that the mortgagor
turned over and delivered the property to the fruit company and the
fruit company had been in actual, adverse and exclusive possession since
the date of delivery and had advanced all money and fertilizer for the
upkeep and maintenance of the grove and had actually produced the
citrus crop and the mortgagor had not been in possession of the property
since delivery. The opinion did not state whether or not the property
was actually deeded to the fruit company; however, the production
credit association-plaintiff alleged that the fruit company claimed an
interest in the real estate under a written instrument which was not of
record. The court cited the 1925 crop lien act and provided that mortgages
on crops not in being may operate as a lien on such crops as soon as
they come into existence provided that they are properly executed,
acknowledged and recorded as a mortgage upon real estate, in order to
be valid against subsequent encumbrancers or subsequent purchasers in
good faith. The court further provided, however, that such a fruit crop
mortgage would not take preference over a prior existing recorded mort-
gage in terms covering the fruit crops and lands, unless subordinated by
the prior mortgagee. The court then ruled that
[I] t is well settled that a valid mortgage lien may be created on
crops of citrus fruit to be grown in the future . . . and the
mortgagor may not defeat the right so acquired by the mort-
gagee by turning over the mortgaged citrus grove to a third
party to produce a crop of fruit covered by the terms of the
mortgage, where the mortgage carried a proper description of
the lands upon which the crops are to be produced and has been
executed, acknowledged and recorded according to law.
The court pointed out that the fruit company had legal notice by the
record of the mortgage that the production credit association held the
first lien on the crop produced to secure the payment of an outstanding
indebtedness and that it could not defeat the lien of the mortgage by
the operation of any agreement between it and the mortgagor to which
the mortgagee was not a party. If the foregoing is not the result to be
applied by a Florida court under the Code, then it is my feeling that the
Florida Legislature misinterpreted the effect which it felt would be
given to the amendment to the uniform code allowing security interests
to attach for seven years under an after-acquired property clause. Of
course, I realize that in suggesting the foregoing (since Chapter 700 has
been repealed) one who takes a crop lien on citrus fruit or other such
natural crops, out of an abundance of precaution, should perhaps perfect
his crop lien both under the Code and under the real estate law, by in-
suring that the security agreement itself, in addition to a financing state-
ment, is filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court and that this
security agreement complies with the requirements for a Florida real
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estate mortgage and is properly acknowledged. The Code, however, does
not expressly repeal Chapter 698, Florida Statutes, covering chattel
mortgages, and certain language therein applicable to crops may be
argued in support of my proposition, without the further analogies to
the real estate characteristics of citrus fruit. (Although 698.12 provides
that the chapter shall not apply to transactions governed by the Code.)
I realize that we have come to an impasse on this subject and we are
really unable to predict what might be the rulings of the courts, although
I feel that we have adequately framed the issues. I do feel strongly, how-
ever, that, if necessary, the literal construction of the Code provisions
must give way to the specific requirements of the agricultural industry in
Florida, as it has developed over the years, and I do not believe that a
court will place a construction upon the Code which will differ so vastly,
as you suggest, from what I feel to be the clear meaning of old Chapter
700 and the court cases in Florida. But let us continue with our dis-
cussion.
We have sometimes made the assumption that the cut-off date under
Fitz was the time of foreclosure. Actually the Florida cases vacillate be-
tween talk of foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and a mere default
under that mortgage.
Mr. Coogan: I would hope that the courts would limit the doctrine to
crops which become such after some public, affirmative act of the real
estate mortgagee. If I understand Florida mortgage law, a real estate
mortgage leaves the mortgagor (and those claiming under him) in pos-
session and control of rents and profits until the real estate mortgagee
ousts him through a receivership or the more drastic act of foreclosure.
Trivial defaults (failure to pay an insignificant tax) may not have come
to the attention even of the parties, much less are they known to third
parties. I have great difficulty in believing that real estate mortgage law
in most states would cut off a UCC security interest in a future crop
by anything less than a receivership or a foreclosure. If a mere
default is effective in cutting off a future crop mortgage, the secured party
must get from the real estate mortgagee evidence that on the date the
maternal blossoms appear no default exists under the mortgage.
Mr. Mays: Perhaps the appointment of a receiver would be the only
effective manner by which to enforce the mortgagee's right to the crop
and proceeds, but that is merely the enforcement procedure. In my
opinion the lien of the mortgage would attach or become effective after
default, at which time the mortgagor could no longer deal with the crops
as personalty nor create interests therein superior to the interests of the
prior mortgagee. But I now recognize our point of departure as to this
very important problem, so let me return to the fixtures question that we
postponed.
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In your book Secured Transactions Under the UCC you comment
on similarities and dissimilarities in the UCC's treatment of two of the
classes of property which have some characteristics of chattels or per-
sonalty and some characteristics of realty. In 9-313(1) the statement is
made that nothing in article 9 prevents the encumbering of fixtures under
real estate law. Do you attach any significance to the fact that there is
no corresponding statement that crops can be mortgaged under a real
estate mortgage? Was this omission intentional or through oversight, as
I suspect?
Mr. Coogan: There is good reason for the lack of a corresponding state-
ment as to crops. There is no doubt that an ordinary real estate mortgage
would create a real estate interest, not a UCC or chattel interest, in a hot
water heater so affixed to the land that it became a fixture; and it would
be covered by the real estate mortgage without special mention. The hot
water heater could retain some of its chattel characteristics only as to
certain persons (typically the conditional vendor) and then only if the
holder of the chattel interest had taken steps prescribed by 9-313 to
preserve his rights in the hot water heater as a chattel. Under the Code,
crops (including citrus fruits, as distinguished from the trees that bear
them) are personalty; if they are to be covered in a real estate mortgage,
you have in effect a combined real estate mortgage and a UCC security
agreement. The parties must comply with formal requirements of both
sets of laws.
C. Recording Formalities: Real and Personal
Mr. Mays: Suppose that 0, the owner of an orange grove, gives a
mortgage on the grove, and on the fruit to be grown thereon for the next
five years. A real estate mortgage often does not contain the addresses of
the parties, and customarily is never signed by the mortgagee. If the mort-
gage itself is to be used as the financing statement, what complications
do you envision?
Mr. Coogan: Without question, I would advise the mortgagee-secured
party to comply with the requirements of both real estate and UCC re-
cording law in Florida (9-401, 9-402). If this caution has not been
followed, I would hope to find something in the document which the
mortgagee could be said to have "adopted" as his signature. "Signature"
is defined in article 1 of the Code to include something less than the tra-
ditional signing associated with a real estate mortgage.
Mr. Mays: After our early discussions concerning this point I have
discovered another recent New Mexico Supreme Court case which held
that a secured party's signature on a financing statement was not essen-
tial.2 ' The court reasoned that such a requirement was illogical and in
1. $tevrell-Paterson Finance Co. v. May, 77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366 (1967).
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conflict with the liberal construction required by the Code to be placed
upon its provisions.
Suppose that the real estate mortgage does not mention crops, but
the mortgage contains the usual "rents, issues and profits" language.
Would you advise that such a mortgage contain the signature and address
of the mortgagee?
Mr. Coogan: I note that the chief draftsman of article 9, Professor
Grant Gilmore, assumes that even here compliance with the filing re-
quirements of article 9 is necessary. This to me is not so clear. The
rights given to a real estate mortgagee by the "rents, issues and profits"
clause are largely judge made. Usually, the language comes into play
only after a receiver is appointed for the mortgaged property. The judge
may deny any benefit of this language-that is, he may not allow the
receiver to resort to personal property brought in by this clause-unless
the land itself is insufficient to pay off the mortgage debt. I should think
that the mortgagee would be entitled to this equitable remedy even in
the absence of filing. He would, of course, come behind a UCC security
interest created before the receivership and possibly behind one under an
after-acquired property clause. But there is some possibility of a
court's saying that this language attempts to create a security interest in
personal property, and that compliance with article 9's filing rules is
essential.
Mr. Mays: You will recall that Florida, like the other big fruit produc-
ing state (California) rejected the provision in the Uniform Commercial
Code that limited a security agreement in future crops to those to be
grown within one year. Let us take a different set of facts where the UCC
security interest is created before the real estate mortgage. Suppose that
Owner gives to S a security interest in present and future crops to be
grown during the next six years and a proper recording is made. Later
O gives a real estate mortgage on the same land. At the end of the fifth
year, 0 defaults on his real estate mortgage payment and, for your benefit,
Mr. Coogan, mortgagee has a receiver appointed. Later new blossoms
appear. Both the article 9 secured party and the receiver for the defaulted
real estate mortgage claim the growing fruit, which at the time of the con-
troversy is barely past the blossom state. Who gets the crop?
Mr. Coogan: I would suppose that the answer depends on the state's
rules as to rights of receivers under real estate mortgages and UCC 9-204.
Section 9-204(1) says that the security interest cannot attach until
(among other things we assume have taken place) the "debtor has rights
in the collateral." He has no such rights "in crops until they are planted
or otherwise become growing crops." If this were an annual crop like
wheat or spinach, that time could be easily ascertained-when the seed
is planted. If the phrase "becomes growing crops" means when the fruit
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tree was planted the UCC interest wins. I would expect a Florida court
to say that no "crops" exist until the first maternal blossoms appear. If
"crop" means this year's fruit, the appointment of a receiver under the
real estate mortgage may cut off the operation of S's after-acquired prop-
erty clause. If the law of the applicable state is as stated in general
treatises, in most states the receiver gets the crop only on a showing that
the mortgagee is not adequately secured by the land. If a receiver was
appointed before this year's blossoms appeared and the court makes such
a finding, it can be argued that the debtor, being supplanted by this re-
ceiver, got no interest in this crop, and therefore S got none. If O's interest
is not taken away, neither is S's.
Mr. Mays: As I have previously discussed, in my opinion, under the
Code, the courts will favor the Code interest because it was filed first.
IV. FRUIT TWICE SOLD: CONFLICTS BETWEEN
SUCCESSIVE PURCHASERS
Mr. Mays: We have previously discussed the existing Florida law as to
whether growing crops are realty or personalty and the numerous cases
concerning the actual or constructive severance of the fruit from the trees
by the intention of the owner. Although none of the cases which we have
discussed expressly involved the competing interest between a purchaser
in bulk of the fruit on the tree and a later purchaser or mortgagee of the
same fruit on the tree, it is my feeling that if there were an immediate
passage of title by virtue of the sale of the fruit in bulk, under a valid
sales contract, it being the intention of the owner to constructively sever
the fruit from the tree, the purchaser or mortgagee of the fruit would have
retained good title to or a lien interest in the fruit as against a subsequent
purchaser of the real estate or as against an existing real estate mortgagee.
I have commented upon the pains taken by the court in the Fitz case in
pointing out that the bill of sale as to the fruit on the trees which was
involved in that controversy was not effective because foreclosure sale
had previously been entered and further the sale was made without present
consideration. Has the Code attempted to handle conflicts between a
buyer of the fruit in bulk on the tree and the holder of a security interest
in the crop? We have several different possible situations. Suppose, first,
that 0, the owner, gives S, a lender, a security interest in a growing crop,
and then makes a contract to sell the crop to B, a Buyer. Since 0 is en-
gaged in the business of farming, S's security interest follows the fruit
into the hands of B, because even though B is a buyer in the ordinary
course of business, he is denied the protection ordinarily given such a
buyer by 9-307-he bought "farm products." If 0 is neither an
owner nor a lessee of the land but a contract processor who has a right
to sell the fruit under a contract with the owner of the land, and 0 has
the right to create a security interest in the crop, query as to whether
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Buyer would not be entitled to protection under 9-307 as a buyer in
ordinary course of business.
Mr. Coogan: You refer, no doubt, to the definition of farm products in
9-109 which makes them farm products only if in the possession of one
engaged in raising . . .or other farming operations." Depending on how
much caretaking the processor does, it could well be held that he is
engaged in farming operations.
Mr. Mays: That being so, let me ask you, Mr. Coogan, the second part
of this question: suppose that B contracts to buy the goods before a
security interest is created?
Mr. Coogan: We must first look to the general article on sales. Section
2-105(1) defines goods as including "growing crops" and other identified
things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed
from realty. Section 2-105(2) provides that "a purported present sale of
future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell."
Section 2-107 says that
A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops...
is a contract for the sale of goods ... even though it forms part
of the realty at the time of contracting, and the parties can by
identification effect a present sale before severance.
Subsection (3) of 2-107 then backtracks to the extent that it keeps in
force any third party rights provided by the law relating to realty records
and the contract will serve as constructive notice to third parties of the
buyer's rights under the contract for sale. If Florida has a non-Code provi-
sion requiring crop sales contracts to be recorded, 2-107(3) would pick up
that requirement. If a recording is otherwise required, 2-107(3) makes
that recording constructive notice. I would suppose a subsequent lender
would be protected in the absence of a required recording by the buyer.
If, outside the Code, there is no such requirement, a subsequent lender
gets no more rights than the owner who has contracted to sell.
Mr. Mays: It is unfortunate that 2-107(3) appears only to be permis-
sive rather than mandatory. Since section (2) expressly recognizes the
validity of a present sale, however, the Code does give us an advantage
over the old law which I do not believe adequately provided for the giving
of constructive notice of such a present or long term sales contract. A
knowledgeable attorney would always have advised that such a contract,
involving considerable sums of money, be acknowledged and recorded,
and although certain provisions of Florida statutes mention the recording
of bills of sale, there was considerable doubt as to the effectiveness of
such recordation.
I have one further point which I know we have previously dis-
cussed, but I merely want to emphasize its importance, in my mind.
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Section 2-107 (3) apparently leaves open a question as to the "laws relating
to realty records." Does this merely mean the law relating to the record-
ing statutes or does it mean case law construing what are interests in real
estate? If a prior real estate mortgage specifically covering crops is only
recorded under the laws relating to real estate and is not recorded in the
manner required to perfect an article 9 security interest, nevertheless, if
the crop is considered as a part of the real estate, it would appear that such
an interest as evidenced by the mortgage would take priority over any
sales contract subsequently recorded under the provisions of 2-107. If,
however, a real estate mortgage does not expressly cover crops, and there
has been a default under the existing real estate mortgage, it would appear
that the proper recordation of any contract for the present sale of the
existing crop executed prior to the default, should take precedence over
the rights of the existing real estate mortgagee but, the Hughes and Haines
City cases to the contrary notwithstanding, such contracts for the future
marketing of the fruit should not create lien interests in crops not yet in
existence even after a default in the real estate mortgage. Do you concur
with this position, Mr. Coogan?
Mr. Coogan: As I have already indicated, my present position is that a
combined mortgage of crops and realty is (i) a chattel mortgage of the
crops (security interest) and (ii) a real estate mortgage of the land. I
agree that a contract for the sale of future crops does not, of itself, create
a security interest or lien at any time. If the contract of purchase and
sale is also a security agreement, the security interest cannot attach until
this crop becomes such.
V. SALES AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS:
SOME FILING PROBLEMS
Mr. Mays: Suppose that an orange grove owner sells his crop in bulk
on the tree two months prior to the time he expects it to be harvested.
Since buyer pays only 25% down, and owner is not completely satisfied
with the buyer's credit standing, he retains a security interest in the crop
until it is fully paid for. How would the owner-seller perfect the security
agreement? Suppose he perfects through filing, where does he file or
record?
Mr. Coogan: For the sake of the point Mr. Mays desires to make, let
us assume that perfection is accomplished through filing (or, in Florida,
recording). In what Code category are the goods? These oranges are
crops in the possession of a farmer, and look like "farm products," in
which case recording should perhaps be made in the public records of
the county where the real estate is located; this would be in accord with
the idea that the public record, with respect to farm connected collateral
is kept locally. But the definition of farm products here is a bit tricky.
Goods are farm products only when in the possession of a debtor engaged
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in farming operations. Here the farmer is not the debtor, but the secured
party. The debtor is a dealer and not a farmer, and as to him the crops
are inventory. As such, they are subject to central filing. This leads to a
trap on description of the "land concerned" under 9-203 and 9-402 which
Mr. Mays will discuss later. But Mr. Mays has offered a better solution.
Mr. Mays: Since the farmer is in possession of the fruit, his security
agreement should provide for a possessory security interest under 9-305.
Then, of course, no filing will be required. Theoretically, it is not even
necessary to have a written security agreement where the farmer-secured
party has possession of the collateral.
Mr. Coogan: This is a matter of proof only-a written agreement would
show what the parties intended by leaving the collateral in seller's posses-
sion. Suppose the citrus grove owner lives in Miami and leaves someone
else in possession?
Mr. Mays: If the person in possession is not the buyer, he can agree to
act as third party pledgee for the owner under 9-305.
Suppose now that the owner is dishonest, and enters into a second
purchase and sale contract with X. X checks the local records, and finds
nothing (since the first buyer's interest was either perfected through
possession or perfected through central filing with the first buyer as
debtor). X pays 50% of the agreed price. Which buyer gets the crop?
Mr. Coogan: The lack of a local recording under article 9 does not pro-
tect X. If there were a Florida statute which together with section 2-107
required a recording in the land records, X would be protected against
the first buyer. Nothing in article 9 says he is protected against the
security interest in favor of the double seller, but it does not take too much
imagination to find an estoppel against a wrongdoer. Assuming that there
is no such statute in Florida, the subsequent purchaser would probably be
in the same position as the subsequent lender we mentioned earlier. He
would have no more rights than the owner and the owner, having already
contracted to sell, has very few rights indeed.
Mr. Mays: Assume that the citrus grower has sold the fruit on the trees
to processor X and that the fruit has been fully paid for or that the grower
does not desire to retain a security interest therein for the remainder of
the purchase price. How would a lending institution to processor X per-
fect a security interest in his inventory collateral consisting of the fruit
remaining on the trees in the possession of the grower?
Mr. Coogan: In Florida the security interest against the fruit as in-
ventory of processor X must be perfected by filing centrally. Here also,
non-Code local law plus UCC 2-107 may require that such a contract
of purchase and sale be recorded in the public records where the real
estate is located regardless of central filing. This may be necessary in
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order to properly protect processor X's financer from a subsequent pur-
chaser of the fruit from the grower, or from the grower's creditors or
trustee in bankruptcy, although not necessarily from creditors of processor
X. To the extent that the grower has not been paid, and his perfection
under 9-305 was the earliest, 9-312 (5) (b) gives him priority over pro-
cessor X's lender notwithstanding other filing or recording.
Mr. Mays: Suppose that caretaker X operates owner's grove, and ad-
vances $5,000 to owner against the crop. How could X obtain a security
interest in the fruit?
Mr. Coogan: If X is truly in possession, again a possessory security
interest seems to be the easy answer. If he records locally, he is doubly
safe and may give notice to innocent parties.
Mr. Mays: Suppose that an owner who operates his grove accepts an
advance from X against the sale price of the crop; owner's reputation for
honesty is good, but he has other unhappy creditors-how can X perfect
a security interest in the crop it has purchased? Clearly local recording
is essential.
Mr. Coogan: The first question is whether owner has sold a crop in
existence, or has contracted to sell a future crop. I will suppose it is the
former. As security for owner's obligation to deliver the fruit, he gives a
security interest therein to X. Here we are dealing with the filing pro-
visions applicable to farm products-the debtor is a farmer and the goods
are in his possession. The land on which crops are grown must be referred
to both in the security agreement and in the financing statement, which in
Florida is recorded in the county records. I will ask Mr. Mays to comment
on the ease or difficulty of describing the land in the security agreement
and in the financing statement.
Mr. Mays: Chapter 67-264, Laws of Florida, 1967, which became
effective on July 1 of this year requires that the financing statement con-
tain a specific legal description of the land upon which the crops are
growing, which, as you know is a departure from the reasonable identifica-
tion provisions of 9-110. Of course, this is no big problem from the stand-
point of the owner of the real estate as he no doubt will have within his
possession complete legal descriptions on all lands which he owns, and a
description of even a five acre tract would not, in most instances, be par-
ticularly difficult. The rub comes, however, as we have already discussed,
when one other than the owner must file and is involved with recording
hundreds of various contracts calling for such descriptions. Not only would
the fees for recording be substantial, but also the buyer-secured party must
run the risk of the ill will of the grower who is perhaps unaccustomed to
such refined treatment of a citrus contract and the inferential question
as to his honesty and integrity. And even if the crops are inventory (and
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hence centrally filed), this requirement applies, although I believe this
requirement is an oversight.
But let's take this problem: Suppose T leases a citrus grove from L.
T makes an agreement with a high credit fruit processor C for the pur-
chase by C of T's crop for the next two years. Against what collateral can
T borrow for some improvements with a life of, say, five years?
Mr. Coogan: T may be able to convince a lender that his rights to pay-
ments under his contract with C are sufficiently certain for him to borrow
what he needs on the strength of his contract rights, which article 9
recognizes as a form of collateral. But generally lenders are not willing to
take the gamble that the debtor may become unable or unwilling to per-
form, in which case no money would be due under the contract, and the
lender would find himself unsecured. For example, T's contract with C
might mean nothing if L can terminate T's lease. But contract rights may
be additional back-up collateral where other collateral is almost adequate.
T might assign existing accounts, and give a purchase money security in-
terest on so much of the improvements as constitute chattels or fixtures. I
assume that T, as a tenant, would have no title to any improvements which
become real property, but I assume that the courts of Florida like many
other courts would be slow to characterize as realty any improvements
made by a tenant unless they are almost nonremoveable or he has some-
thing close to a fee-say a 99 year lease.
I suppose you would advise this bank that T has enough rights in the
collateral to create a security interest therein-T's right to collect from
the purchaser the proceeds of his contract. Evaluation of these rights
requires a credit judgment. What assurance have we that there will be a
crop each year? Will there be sufficient proceeds? If a crop is destroyed
by frost, will insurance proceeds be specifically assigned? Can owner be
counted on not to sell to someone other than purchaser? Will T lose his
lease? On a long term contract, it may be wise to notify the purchaser
that the contract proceeds have been assigned.
Contract rights against high credit companies furnish the basis upon
which multimillion dollar transactions are financed. Here all risks are
studiously evaluated at the outset, and the contracts are especially drawn
to furnish loanable collateral.
Mr. Mays: For the reasons you have given the person who makes an
advance to a grower in reliance on the existence of a marketing arrange-
ment is more likely to be the processor-purchaser himself, rather than a
bank. The processor is more able to evaluate the situation, and in a
measure, control it. An accounts financer may find that a financer of
inventory or farm products is claiming some of the accounts as proceeds
realized from the sale of those goods. This conflict could, of course, arise
between one who claims contract rights or accounts and one who claims
inventory or farm products dealt with under the applicable contract.
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Mr. Coogan: This would not seem too likely in the case of one who is
primarily a citrus grower, rather than a dealer. If it happens, the Code
offers no clear rule as to priority. The only safe rule is that the same
lender should control credit on both farm products or inventory and
contract rights and accounts resulting therefrom. If another lender is to
be allowed to come in, there should be a satisfactory subordination agree-
ment between the secured parties as to who gets what collateral.
Mr. Mays: Mr. Coogan, give us your thoughts as to why you would
expect a lender to give a higher value to existing receivables than to
future receivables or contract rights?
Mr. Coogan: In short, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
The existence of a contract usually means that the debtor can sell
his goods if he has them to sell and does not go back on his word. The
certainty or uncertainty that T will have future receivables is a matter of
foretelling the future from the past. The lender will be almost assured
that he will get the receivables if they come into existence, but he does not
have complete certainty that he will get the receivables, even if he was the
first to file as to accounts.
Mr. Mays: Since one can perfect a security interest in accounts only
through filing, insofar as farm products are concerned, is there any ques-
tion whether the lender who files first can be certain that any accounts
covered by his agreement will be his?
Mr. Coogan: The accounts might be claimed as "proceeds" of a security
interest in farm products, including a purchase money security interest
therein. Perhaps there is no great practical problem as to purchase money
interests where the collateral is farm products, because ordinarily the
farmer raises those farm products. Suppose, however, that T is a bit of a
trader as well as a grower.
Mr. Mays: You mean that T is what we call a "bird dog."
Mr. Coogan: T gives to S a security interest in present and future ac-
counts. T later buys from X on credit a load of oranges which T resells to
C. X and T perfect a purchase money security interest in the oranges and
X claims "proceeds." X claims a designated account produced by the sale
of these oranges on the theory that they are "proceeds" of his oranges,
and S claims under his general assignment of accounts.
Mr. Mays: Did X give any notice of his claim to S, who held a pre-
viously perfected security interest in T's accounts?
Mr. Coogan: You refer no doubt to the provisions of section 9-312(3)
which require the holder of a purchase money interest in inventory to
given notice and to file before he delivers the inventory to the debtor as a
condition to his coming ahead of earlier filers. Let us assume here that
S had filed as to accounts and contract rights but not as to inventory. No
notice is required under that section except to other inventory financers.
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Mr. Mays: I suppose another reason that no notice was required is that
9-312(3) refers only to purchase money security interests in inventory
and here the collateral was probably farm products.
Mr. Coogan: Again, what the businessman thinks of as inventory is
not "inventory" if it is farm products, and the notice requirements of
section 9-312(3) do not apply. As we have seen, crops can be inventory
if not in the possession of a debtor engaged in farming.
Mr. Mays: If the purchase money man claims accounts as proceeds
which are automatically perfected under section 9-306 when they came
into existence, I suppose that section 9-312 (5) (b) would apply. We look
to see which security interest was first "perfected."
Mr. Coogan: And we are left with the apparent answer that both are
perfected simultaneously when the account arises. X will argue that he
should take priority because his accounts are a continuation of a security
agreement created in farm products or inventory weeks or months before
the account came into existence. S will argue that X could have learned
of S's interest from his public filing as to accounts. The short answer is
that we do not know how the courts will resolve an issue left open by
article 9.
VI. STATUTORY LIENS: THE EFFECT OF ARTICLE 9
Mr. Mays: May I change the subject? Section 9-310 says that certain
liens created by statutes other than the Code take priority over Code
created security interests unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Mr. Coogan: I should point out that Section 9-310 applies only to statu-
tory liens for persons who supply materials and services on goods in their
possession. No Florida statutory lien of this character has been called to
my attention.
Mr. Mays: I would mention a lien which is not entitled to priority under
9-310, because it is non-possessory, but is given priority by the statute
which creates it. Section 85.22, Florida Statutes, 1965, gives a lien to one
who makes advances or supplies goods to one "in the business of planting,
farming . . ." which is superior to a lien of prior dignity [saving liens for
certain labor] on crops grown. This lien can be created only with consent
of the owner, and only if a recording is made. This is, therefore, not the
usual statutory lien which ordinarily is created without regard to the
wishes of the owner.
It is common for an owner of a citrus grove to employ someone else,
who may or may not purchase the crop, to perform caretaking services for
the citrus grove-to fertilize, cultivate, spray and pick the fruit. Hence,
under section 85.22, as we have discussed, with written consent of the
owner, a lien could be given on the crop.
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Also, section 85.04 provides for a lien on the real estate, for certain
labor performed on groves, and section 85.10 provides for a lien on crops
for certain labor or overseeing performed on the crops. Although section
84.22 clearly sets forth the circumstances under which that lien shall take
priority, what would be the possible effect of the other two lien statutes?
I feel that under the general provisions of sections 85.25 and 85.26,
although not so expressly stated, the liens created under chapter 85
should not take priority over existing interests, unless notice thereof is
recorded, or such interests arise at approximately the same time that
services are being rendered and therefore the holder of the existing interest
is or should be placed on notice of the possibility of the lien. In such event,
the notice or posting of the groves by those performing caretaking services
may have a great effect upon the provisions of sections 85.25 and 85.26,
for such posting should no doubt give subsequent purchasers or mort-
gagees notice and render them subordinate to the lien for caretaking
services. This type of posting, of course, is normal practice by most large
grove caretakers.
Would such an agreement need to comply with article 9, including
recording, or would the usual practice of posting give adequate public
notice?
Mr. Coogan: It seems to me that section 85.22 fits pretty squarely into
the area pre-empted by article 9. If I am correct 85.22 should have been
repealed specifically, and was repealed by implication. In any event the
section 85.22 lien transaction would seem to be unlike the ordinary statu-
tory lien, which is imposed without regard to the consent of the owner.
As I see it, no lien comes into existence unless as a result of a contract-
it therefore seems to be a security interest created by contract in personal
property, and hence falls under section 9-102 (1) (a). Assuming that it is
an article 9 security interest, posting is not a substitute for filing under
article 9. The other lien interests which you have pointed out appear to
constitute the normal statutory lien situations to which article 9 does
not apply under the provisions of section 9-104(3), and their priorities
will therefore be governed by the provisions of the lien statute itself or
case law. On the basis of general security law ("first in time, first in
right"), I would hazard the guess that these statutory liens, not being en-
titled to section 9-310's priority, because not possessory liens, would
taken priority over an article 9 interest only if prior in time and "per-
fected" as the statute prescribes.
Mr. Mays: You therefore advise that every caretaker who wishes to
take advantage of section 85.22 should file a financing statement with
respect to each of his customers?
Mr. Coogan: That conclusion by no means follows. In most business
transactions before and after the Code the parties rely on each other's
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general credit. But if any protection against third parties is sought, filing
is called for. The question raises the same problems as did the question
whether a buyer who makes an advance against a crop should take a
security interest therein, with all the trouble of describing the real estate.
Each case is a matter of business judgment.
Mr. Mays: Those rendering services or goods or materials to groves
should insure, if they are relying upon the normal type of statutory lien,
that they fall within the provisions of the Florida lien statutes and will
be governed accordingly as to their priority to pre-existing interests and
those interests arising in the future. Or, if they are relying upon section
85.22, then they should consider the specific problems which we have dis-
cussed. Likewise, a grower's lender or a purchaser of the grove or of only
the fruit must also consider the possibility of statutory liens which have
arisen or which shall or may arise in the future and note that they cannot
always rely upon the existence or non-existence of a financing statement
or other such instrument recorded pursuant to a particular statute.
Mr. Coogan: This brings up the question often raised in business loans:
B agrees with lender L that he will not create liens in favor of any other
person. Now he violates that agreement and the person in whose favor
the lien is created knows that the "negative pledge" has been violated.
Or suppose the person gets the lien without knowledge of the prohibition
against it?
Mr. Mays: You have stated the questions-what are the answers?
Mr. Coogan: The courts have never, to my knowledge, definitely an-
swered the question, but most corporate lawyers assume that one who
takes a lien in violation of a "no lien" clause is in trouble.
VII. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF SECTION 9-312(2)
Mr. Mays: We have not discussed section 9-312(2), which reads as
follows:
A perfected security interest in crops for new value given to
enable the debtor to produce the crops during the production
season and given not more than three months before the crops
become growing crops by planting or otherwise takes priority
over an earlier perfected security interest to the extent that such
earlier interest secures obligations due more than six months
before the crops become growing crops by planting or otherwise,
even though the person giving new value had knowledge of the
earlier security interest.
Apparently you do not attach much importance to this section?
Mr. Coogan: I do not attach too much importance to this section only
because its scope is so limited. Let us say that 0 mortgages his land to M
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and the parties make it clear that this mortgage specifically covers crops.
O goes into default in December on his combined realty-crop mortgage.
In February he applies to Bank A for a loan to produce this year's crop.
Subsection (2) is of no avail, because its priority is only over other
security interests securing obligations more than six months overdue, and
O's obligation here is only four months overdue.
If the law of Florida as expressed in Fitz v. Eldridge is that a prior
real estate mortgagee takes priority as to a crop which comes into bloom
after a default in the real estate mortgage occurs, 9-312 (2) would never
come into operation, because no chattel security interest can arise after
default in the real estate mortgage. If we interpret Fitz in the light of
Summerlin, on which it relies, the crucial test is whether foreclosure has
begun before the first blossoms appear. The real estate mortgagee would
argue that section 9-312(2) properly interpreted has no application to
his rights to the crops as rents, issues and profits because "security inter-
est" means an article 9 interest, and he only claims a judicially created
ancillary remedy under real estate law. My own feeling is that section
9-312(2) does not go far enough to accomplish its purpose. If the Code
is adopted with the Code's one year limit on future crops, the new
security interest protected under 9-312(2) could take priority only
over another security interest created under a long term real estate trans-
action mentioned in 9-204. The obligation secured must be in default for
six months, but the real estate mortgage securing it must not have been
foreclosed. The after-acquired property clause of the new security agree-
ment for the new crop advance will, when the crop comes into existence,
take priority over the after-acquired property clause of the defaulted se-
curity agreement.
VIII. PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS: PROBLEMS IN OWNERSHIP
Mr. Mays: Much of the citrus fruit in Florida is sold by individual
growers under the type of contract we have been discussing. A great
amount of fruit however, is sold by growers to various processors on what
is called a participation basis. Basically, under such agreements, citrus
fruit is both picked and delivered by a grower to a processor under pro-
visions in the participation agreement under which the buyer is vested
with the authority to direct the fruit to the facilities for which they are
best suited. This may be for processing into frozen orange concentrate
or single strength juice, the cannery, fresh fruit packing houses, or some-
where else. The returns to the grower are based upon the amount received
on the ultimate sale of the processed products less all cost of processing
and marketing and a fixed fee per unit processed which represents the
processor's profit. The individual grower's fruit is handled in a pool with
other growers similarly situated who have delivered the same variety
fruit, and his receipts are based on average return, no matter how
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marketed. The processor may be a non-profit marketing co-operative or
may be a corporation for profit, and may also engage in conventional pur-
chases of fruit, in which instance the processor takes title to the fruit
upon delivery. The customary fruit participation agreement may not
specifically mention the passage of title, but the grower may assume (cor-
rectly or not) that he owns the product up to the point when sales
are made by the processor, but that the processor is authorized to
deliver title. Almost universally, the various processors enter into in-
ventory, warehouse receipts and accounts receivable financing upon their
entire inventory and accounts, and their inventory may include participa-
tion basis fruit, conventionally purchased fruit and fruit from groves
owned by the processor.
Mr. Coogan: To an outsider, these participation agreements seem to be
the product of one of two causes: either they grew up among businessmen
without benefit of counsel, or each counsel felt that his client had a vested
interest in an arrangement so loose that he could argue whatever position
later seemed most favorable. Granted that ambiguities sometimes serve
useful purposes, it would seem desirable for the industry to determine
the pattern under which it is operating-or several alternative patterns, if
that is better. It is impossible to draw a clear-cut security pattern where
one cannot determine who owns the collateral.
Mr. Mays: Suppose we consider two alternatives; (a) the contracts
make it clear that the grower retains title to the crop until the processor
effects a sale; (b) the contracts become contracts of sale by the grower
to the processor, with the selling price to be determined by the average
price of oranges or orange products sold for all categories during a cer-
tain period of time.
Mr. Coogan: Take the first one: if title to the goods remains in the
grower, his creditors can attach the goods by legal process, if they can
identify them. The processor could not borrow against that part of this
"inventory" which represents goods owned by someone else. This may
make both inventory and accounts financing by the processor very diffi-
cult. If grower A's goods are subject to a security interest, A's secured
party may seek to recover the goods or their proceeds. If there are a
hundred "A's," the processor is in trouble. The language of section 9-315
allows A's secured party to assert his security interest in the frozen orange
concentrate.
Mr. Mays: Suppose under alternative (b) that the contract calls for a
sale by grower to processor. The grower is not particularly happy with
the processor's credit and retains a security interest. Or the grower's
financer insists on retaining the security interest he obtained at an earlier
stage. As we have seen, where the collateral is farm products, section
9-307(1) does not protect the rights of a buyer in ordinary course of
business.
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Mr. Coogan: The processor has the same problems that bedevil any
purchaser of farm products. If he purchases from a small number of
suppliers, he should be able to work out an acceptable understanding.
With many suppliers, I do not know of any solution.
Mr. Mays: Since a grower who pools his fruit in a participation agree-
ment may not receive any receipts from the sale thereof for an extended
period of time, there may be instances in which the grower will need to
borrow money using the participation agreements as collateral. Borrowing
from an institutional lender on the basis of these participation agreements
is not a customary practice, perhaps because many of the processors,
themselves, are willing to finance or make advances to the grower. Al-
though the processor will certainly be in a better position to evaluate the
worth of the agreements as collateral than a financing institution, both
such possible lenders would face the same vexing problems in perfecting a
security interest in the receipts from the pool. Section 9-401 provides that
accounts, contract rights or general intangibles arising from or relating to
the sale of farm products by a farmer are perfected by recording in the
Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in the county of the debtor's resi-
dence, although at first blush it may appear to the unwary that filing
should be done centrally.
Bank counsel should always bear in mind, however, that there can
be conflicts between the secured party who holds a perfected security
interest in the crops themselves as well as those involving inventory and
accounts receivable financing between the processor and another lender.
Therefore, prior to making any loan based on these participation receipts
as collateral, a search of the records should be made both locally against
the debtor and centrally against the processor. The risks involved in
such financing may be a considerable deterrent to loans by a financial
institution on the basis of such collateral and it is apparent why the pro-
cessor is in much better position to make advances on these receipts. Of
course, these processors should take the steps required for perfection in
order to protect themselves against the grower's creditors or trustee in
bankruptcy.
Mr. Coogan: All you say is true, but you do not cover all the risks.
Unfortunately the UCC does not tell us who has priority when one
secured party claims an account as "proceeds" (9-306) of this inventory
or farm products and a second secured party claims the same account
under an accounts financing agreement. We can juggle the facts-the
farm products financer filed first, the accounts financer filed first; or we
can suppose that the farm products security interest was perfected
through a method other than filing. No amount of care, no searching of
the record can give absolute protection. In most situations one probably
can get all secured parties to sign an agreement which sets forth an
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agreed order of priorities. Anything less that that leaves some uncertainty
and risk.
IX. PRiORiIEs UNDER ARTICLE 9
Mr. Mays: Among the conflicts you just referred to there are very
real conflicts under the Code involving the competing interests between
an inventory financer of a processor, accounts receivable financer of a
processor, and a lender who relies on either negotiable or non-negotiable
warehouse receipts issued upon citrus concentrate in bulk, placed in
warehouses. Of course, the textbook rule which would always be desir-
able to heed, is that when a search of the records (or inquiry as to pos-
sible security interests perfected by a method other than filing) reveals
the likelihood of financing by more than one lender in any of the fore-
going types of collateral, either subordination agreements should be ob-
tained, or one lender should do all the financing. For many practical
reasons, however, counsel for the various lenders should be aware of
the provisions of the Code which are applicable to the conflicting security
interests represented by the foregoing collateral.
Mr. Coogan: If we are to discuss priorities, let us run through some
typical cases.
Mr. Mays: Bank A records a financing statement on D's farm products.
Before D receives any advance from A, D borrows $1000 from Bank B
against the same farm products. Now D goes back to A and gets $2000.
Whose security interest has priority?
Mr. Coogan: This hypothesis involves one of the real changes made
by article 9. This case is not handled by any of the special priority rules
referred to in section 9-312 and therefore falls under the catchall of sub-
section (5). Since both security interests were perfected through filing,
clause (a) governs, giving priority to the secured party who filed first,
regardless of when other requisites for a security interest were completed.
Mr. Mays: Bank A again records before any other transaction. Bank
B however, makes its advance against a non-negotiable warehouse re-
ceipt made out in B's name.
Mr. Coogan: Here we have the other side of section 9-312(5)-this
time clause (b) gives priority to the person who first completed all the
steps to create a perfected security interest.
Mr. Mays: Bank A again records first, claiming inventory which it
wrongly believes to be in D's possession. A advances $1000 to D. The
inventory is in fact in a warehouse. Bank B makes an advance against a
negotiable warehouse receipt of which it takes delivery.
Mr. Coogan: Under 9-304(2), because the goods were at the time rep-
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resented by a negotiable document, a security interest in the document
controls. Suppose, Mr. Mays, that Bank B had taken possession of a
non-negotiable document in this case?
Mr. Mays: The non-negotiable document is not the kind of collateral
in which perfection can be achieved through possession alone (section
9-305 limits documents to those in negotiable form); but section 9-304 (3)
permits perfection through the secured party's taking a non-negotiable
document in his own name. Considering the provisions of both article 7,
and article 9, and the manner by which they affect the priorities question,
it is apparent that Bank B which takes its security interest in non-
negotiable warehouse receipts, would take subject to A's previously per-
fected security interest in the inventory itself. Section 7-504(1) and (2)
provides that a transferee of a negotiable or non-negotiable document to
whom the document has been delivered, but not duly negotiated, acquires
title and rights which his transferor had or had authority to convey.
Mr. Coogan: We have by no means exhausted the possible combinations
with respect to warehouse receipts, negotiable and non-negotiable. We
can do no more than call attention to sections 9-310, 9-304, 9-305 and
9-309 of article 9 and various sections of article 7 and Documents of Title.
X. CONCLUSION
This drama ends with a whimper. Both players declined to include
a lengthy summation, feeling that perhaps, for the moment at least, the
field of crop financing has been adequately tilled. (Ed.)
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